Ashraf al-Hoque

Introduction

In this period of the “War on Terror”, Islam, and consequently Muslim peoples, have found themselves very much in the spotlight. Terrorist atrocities and political discontent are more often than not attributed to “fanatical Muslims”, hell-bent upon the “destruction” of western civilisation. Much media, political, and academic attention is bestowed upon an attempt to understand “radical Muslims” who are willing to perform the ultimate sacrifice in the pursuit of attaining Salvation through God’s Mercy. Such “radicals” justify their actions and perceptions by claiming that they are fulfilling a divine edict – a command from the Almighty to fight against the oppressors and enemies of Islam and raise the triumphant standard of Islam on earth. Radical discourse is laden with examples of aggressive foreign policy towards Muslim states; exposés of western imperialist ambitions and contempt towards the “decadence” of the “western way of life” in contrast with the superior “Islamic way of life”. This vocal minority of so-called Muslims have, for reasons beyond the scope of our current discussion, enjoyed much airtime in recent years. Radical discourse has penetrated western society to such an extent, that any discussion concerning Islam is compelled to incorporate the religion’s “radical fringes”. But is this attitude justified? It is my contention that the appearance of radical Islam and its subsequent rise is a direct reaction to the failure of alternative ideological experiences with which the Muslim world had negotiated after the collapse of colonialism. Moreover, the apparent demise of such ideologies in the Muslim heartlands created a political landscape for the articulation of a romantic notion; a “return” to Islam manifest through the adoption of distinctly modern political modus operandi. However, it should be noted that although radical Islam is, in many ways, a vehicle for “protest politics” for disenfranchised Muslims, its specific methods of articulating such grievances are a wholly recent phenomenon, following the collapse of Arab Nationalism and pan-Islamism in the mid-twentieth century. Before this period, Muslim discontent was articulated through an array of alternative means. This paper aims to highlight the significant difference in Muslim “protest politics” in the modern era through a brief observation of two significant figures: Sayyid Qutub and W.H. Quilliam, both of whom were significantly perturbed by the political developments of their respective eras. Whereas Qutub’s intellectual doctrine has received a degree of worldwide recognition and success in the latter part of the twentieth century to the present day, the life and works of Quilliam (at the turn of the twentieth century) remains historically peripheral in the development of modern Muslim politics. In highlighting the different approaches advocated by these two individuals, I aim to demonstrate the heterogeneity of Muslims vis-à-vis their political attitudes and, more often than not, that these political attitudes are circumstantial to factors such as “time” and “place” and must not be attributed to a generic perception of a supposed “Muslim psyche”.

Sayyid Qutub and the advent of Political Islam

From the mid-twentieth century onwards, political Islam or “Islamism” has emerged as a notable discourse among Muslims the world-over. Scholars are somewhat divided on the issue of defining such a discourse; some claim that political Islam is merely a form of Islamic nationalism (Jurgensmeyer 1993:47), others argue that the advent of such an ideology was incepted as an alternative to the secular nation state (Tibi 1992:183). Others still, suggest that political Islam is a synthesis of both nationalist and theocratic discourses (Al-Azmeh 1993:69). A cursory glance at the various Islamist organisations that currently exist suggests at least one definitive aspect of Political Islam: that political Islams rather than political Islam best describes the different kinds of movements which have emerged throughout the century to ‘contest politics in domestic, regional and international settings’ (Milton-Edwards 2004:121). Although the various Islamist organisations may disagree with each other in the case of specific strategies and methodology, it appears that a salient objective binds them all: the inseparable dimension of politics to be included within the realm of all that is “Islamic” and the creation of a distinct “Islamic state” where shari’ah law is enforced according to the precedent, they argue, Mohammed and his disciples set in seventh century Arabia. This specific teleological extrapolation of the formative period of Islam serves the Islamist agenda as it emphasises the need for reform, revolution, and ultimately the consequent “revival” of Islam on earth, just as Mohammed supposedly espoused. The origins of this branch of thought, as I have mentioned earlier, can be traced to the mid-twentieth century, particularly in the middle-east. While Islam has always acknowledged the political as well as the spiritual, a recent resurgence of Islam as a political force for change has taken place in ‘response to the westernisation of society as a result of colonialism, the struggle for independence and the establishment of the post-colonial nation state’ (Milton-Edwards 1993:122). The avant-garde doctrines of political Islam deliberately denounce popular forms of Islam in favour of the “original” – excluding most of the beliefs and practices of popular culture, including religio-magical* practices, which are deemed as “corrupt” (Zubaida 1993: 118). Political Islam’s wrangling with both external hegemonic influences and its discontent towards the contemporary state of Islam pose as equal impetuses towards the realisation of its objectives.

The prominent apostle of political Islam, Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966), personifies the adhesive elements of the ideology. Qutub was a leading intellectual of the Muslim Brotherhood, (the world’s largest international Islamist movement), in the 1950s and 60s. His contribution towards the inauguration of post-colonial Islamist doctrines in our current period cannot be overstated. Qutub’s childhood was spent in the rural Egyptian village of Musha, were he received his preliminary education in Qur’anic studies. In early adult life, Qutub moved to Cairo where he completed his education and sought employment as a school teacher. From 1948–1950, he visited the United States of America in order to study the educational system, after securing a scholarship. It is widely accepted that Qutub’s experience in America profoundly influenced his subsequent works as a prolific writer and social critic. His American visit seems to have sparked in him the desire to seek ‘sources of cultural and moral authenticity’. Qutub continuously cited examples of the apparent social malaise and decadence prevalent with American society and the west in general. Qutub argued that Egyptian society itself had fallen victim to the corrupt and cynical advances of the west and vociferously campaigned against the Free Officer’s regime. In turn, this resulted in multiple imprisonments and, ultimately, his execution in 1966. Moreover, it was American exposure itself that directly influenced his infamous doctrine of jahiliyya (pre-Mohammedan pagan ignorance) which, to this day, constitutes the philosophical foundation of Islamist movements worldwide. Inspired partly by the thirteenth century puritanical theologian Ibn Taymiyyah but most specifically by the twentieth century Pakistani political philosopher and founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party in South Asia, Abul ‘ala Maududi, Qutub extracted the jurisprudential concept of jahiliyya wholesale, devoid of its historical context, rendering it with “universal validity”, suitable especially in contemporary societies:

“We are today in a jahiliyya similar to that contemporaneous to Islam or worse. Everything around us is a jahiliyya: peoples perceptions and beliefs, habits and customs, the sources of their culture, arts and literature, and their laws and legislations. Every much of what we think of as Islamic culture, Islamic sources or Islamic philosophy and thought is in fact the making of this jahiliyya” (Qutub in Ayubi 1991:139)

Qutub’s prognosis against the future success of this evident “disease” is the declaration of total sovereignty and rulership of God or hakimiyya:

“To declare divinity for God alone…means a full revolt against human rulership in all its shapes and forms, systems and arrangements…It means the destroying of the kingdom of man to establish the kingdom of God on earth…the wresting of power from the hands of its human usurpers to return it to God alone; the supremacy of divine law alone and the cancellation of human laws” (Qutub in Ayubi 1991:137/8)

The appeal of Qutubian thought must be contextualised as a symptom of the ideological and political vacuum created under the Nasserite state or through the prism of Arab Nationalism in general, particularly affecting the younger generations. Qutub’s formulations were thus an attempt at providing an ideological response to the Nasserite project that emphasised state building and a nominal conception of Arab “unity”, but lacked intellectual, moral and political fulfilment. Yet the Qutubian trend was in turn a mirror image of the Nasserite project, revolving similarly around the state and regarding the act of government as the fundamental catalyst for social change (Ayubi 1991:142). Qutub’s innovative and hitherto unprecedented doctrines that emerged within the early phases of the post-colonial milieu were symptomatic of and circumstantial to that period; both in its modernist design and “Islamic” nuances. Furthermore, his political theory should not be mistaken for a self-styled unitary ‘Muslim vanguard’ for resistance, as is so often misconstrued in our age; but rather, as simply one artery of Muslim colonial/post-colonial dissidence, among a multitude of contenders. Among whom, W.H. Quilliam acts as a pertinent example for our purposes.

W.H. Quilliam, and the Liverpool congregation

W. H. Quilliam (1856-1932) was born in Liverpool to wealthy middle-class parents. He was raised as a Christian from early childhood and became a successful solicitor in his early adult life. During a visit to Morocco in 1887, Quilliam converted to Islam. Upon his return to Liverpool, he established the city’s first mosque and Islamic Institute in 1889. From this early base, Quilliam went on to establish a Muslim college that accepted students that were both Muslim and non-Muslim. The college also accommodated a weekly Debating and Literary Society attracting many intellectuals, some of whom converted to Islam and, in turn, became part of the congregation. Quilliam was also an active writer and was responsible the establishment for the first British Muslim weekly journal, The Crescent, in 1893, which was widely circulated among Muslims in the colonies as well as in Britain itself. It became apparent, after his return from North Africa, that Quilliam was intent on fashioning a concrete presence of Islam and Muslims in Britain: a protagonist of a distinctly “British Islam” (Germain 2007:130). His indefatigable efforts to promote and defend Islam both in Britain and its colonies earned him honours from the Islamic world. He was appointed Sheikh al-Islam of Britain by the Ottoman Sultan Hamid II and Persian Consul to Liverpool by the Shah of Iran as well as receiving bursaries for his mosque and institute from the Emir of Afghanistan. Despite his wealth, education, character, status as a white Briton and his desire for a peaceful co-existence with non-Muslim Britons, Quilliam and his congregation faced fierce antagonism from his compatriots. In the Britain of Quilliam, Islam was viewed with great suspicion. Popular antagonism towards Islam, triggered by the mass media, became manifest on the local level. Quilliam and his congregation became subject to ridicule and, at least on one occasion, violence: Christian zealots gathered outside the mosque during prayer time awaiting the dispersal of the worshippers, upon their arrival, the mob pelted mud, stones and filth at the Muslims while voiced their disapproval of this “un-English” religion. A local newspaper sympathised with the mob commenting:

“To hear the muezzin (sexton) here is most incongruous, unusual, silly and unwelcome, and the man who stands howling on the first floor of the balcony in such a fashion is certain to collect a ribald crowd, anxious to offer a copper or two to go into the next street, or even ready to respond to his invitation with something more than jeers” (Ansari 2004:83)

Medieval anxieties between the realm of Christendom and Islam were purposefully re-ignited. By the end of the nineteenth century, the demise of the Ottoman Empire was inevitable, certainly as far as European powers were concerned. The eventual death of the Ottoman Empire opened up a tantalising prospect for British imperial ambitions, particularly in terms of territorial expansion. In order to maximise this opportunity, Britain’s hitherto decline in imperial expansion required rejuvenation which, in turn, necessitated a program of hegemonic legitimisation of the endeavour. Thus, a revived “moral crusade” was enacted against the Ottoman state, in order to uproot: “the Turkish tyrant – brutal, barbarous, perfidious…the enemy of domestic happiness, of Christianity and civilisation” (Daniel 1966:37). British politicians and the press combined to embark upon a systematic campaign to deface the Ottoman Empire in order to rally popular support for their purposes. Even some quarters of the British clergy contributed to the debate denouncing Islam as a “nauseous abomination”, verifying popular perceptions of Muslims as despotic, corrupt, sexually deprived, fanatical and chauvinistic. This was further bolstered by previous Victorian depictions of Islam in art and literature (Ansari 2004:81). These perceptions of the “degenerate Moor” were reproduced in accessible and popular forms such as newspaper cartoons, music-hall songs, novels and religious journals, and from the beginning of the twentieth century in photographs and cinema. Respectable newspapers and journals such as The Times, The Contemporary Review, and The Nineteenth Century published diatribes condemning the Ottoman Empire as, in the words of one commentator, the: ‘great anti-Christian and anti-social power… founded on slavery and polygamy and operating by massacre and rape’ (Muslim Outlook, 20 November 1919 in Ansari 2004:81). As harmonious co-existence proved to be a near impossibility during this turbulent and aggressive milieu, W.H. Quilliam turned his attention to redressing the balance in an attempt to re-align popular British perceptions of Islam and invoking a spirit of resistance against such fallacious and cynical propaganda among Muslim subjects of the empire.

Quilliam utilised his established periodicals to urge Muslims of the colonies not to participate in British military campaigns directed against other Muslims, such as in Sudan. He encouraged Muslims neither to take up arms against their co-religionists nor to even nominally aid the imperial apparatus under any circumstance;

“For any True Believer to take up arms and fight against another Muslim is contrary to the Shariat, and against the law of God and his holy prophet…I warn every True-Believer that if he gives the slightest assistance in this projected expedition against the Muslims of the Soudan [sic.], even to the extent of carrying a parcel, or giving a bite of bread to eat or a drink of water to any person taking part in the expedition against these Muslims that he thereby helps the Giaour [sic.] against the Muslim, and his name will be unworthy to be continued upon the roll of the faithful”. (The Crescent, March 25th 1896, Vol. VII, No. 167, p. 617)

Quilliam’s fervent advocacy of Muslim solidarity and united resistance against anti-Muslim imperial policies were also a prominent feature of his discourse;

“At the present time, union is more than ever necessary among Muslims. The Christian powers are preparing a new crusade in order to shatter the Muslim powers, under the pretext that they desire to civilise the world…This is nothing but hypocrisy, but armed as they are with the resources of Western civilisation it will be impossible to resist them unless the Muslims stand united in one solid phalanx”. (The Crescent, April 22nd 1896, Vol. VII, No. 171, pp. 681-682)

In addition to this, Quilliam’s publications challenged ideas such as Islam being the: “enemy of science”; “backward”; “warlike”; “fanatical”; and “irreconcilable to Christian values”, or as “ill-treating women”, and “favouring slavery”. Furthermore, Quilliam’s self-adopted role in internationally publicising the scale of injustices perpetrated against Muslim minorities of British dominions directly affected policies towards Muslims in places as far a field as South Africa and Australia (Germain 2007:132).

Conclusion

W.H. Quilliam and Sayyid Qutub represented two contrasting styles of political engagement. Qutub espoused a programme of total detachment and rejection of the secular social democratic mechanism whereas Quilliam chose to address political grievances without the desire to systematically dismantle existing social and political structures; although both were essentially concerned with “Muslim” issues. Islamism as a political doctrine rose, along with other ideologies, at a specific time, in order to provide alternative solutions to both local and global anxieties. The Liverpool congregation, in comparison, specifically lobbied authorities within their own sphere of direct influence for the amendment of popular attitudes and policies towards Muslims within the British dominions. At no point did Quilliam or his congregation call for the creation of a distinct “Islamic state” for the Muslims of the empire; nor did he or his followers advocate an “Islamist revolution” or violent acts against the British in response to their subordinating policies. Rather, an atmosphere of tolerance and dialogue was promoted, consistent with hundreds of years of Muslim co-existence in numerous parts of the world. In contemporary times, Islamists have created a platform for dissent on a global level; moreover, Islamist organisations such as Hamas, Muslim Brotherhood, Front Islamique du Salut and Jamaat-e-Islami, among others, have emerged as self-styled vanguards for the revocation of the “return” of Islam per se: to elevate Muslims from the decadence of western civilisation.

One must appreciate that organisations of this nature are situated within the historical and political context of the post-colonial era and as such are altogether innovative and, contrary to Islamists’ own perceptions, a clear epistemological break from previous traditions. The efforts of the Liverpool congregation, however, represent an altogether different approach towards presenting political dissent and one that is grossly lacking within community politics in Britain; where Muslims tend to be generally politically quietist (for reasons beyond the scope of my current discussion). Although the appeal of Islamists among Muslims remain peripheral in Britain, their ostentatious resistance to local as well as global policies as well as their ubiquitous “acceptance” by the British media as “voices of Islam”, have bred an erroneous impression within mainstream British society that Islamists represent “Muslim resistance”. It seems that the lack of political participation by the majority of British Muslims has created a vacuum for the Islamists and the powers that be to exploit. British Muslims therefore need to awaken from their slumber and politically engage with the mainstream if this process is to be reversed a la the Liverpool congregation; or face further draconian policies implemented towards them that will only further fuel the fire for Islamist fury and the continuation of large-scale civilian atrocities.

*Religio-magical is used in Anthropology to refer to practices or beliefs related to metaphysical matters

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